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Introduction
Alternative modes of dispute resolution such as mediation and conciliation are, in most circumstances able to improve the strain 
relationship between the disputants. Only when the 
parties are unable to resolve the dispute amicably 
would adjudication before the court become 
necessary as the last resort. To this end, members of 
the legal fraternity would have to place their clients’ 
interests above their own, and to discard their litigation-
based mindset, promoting mediation although it may 
lead to less revenue. Individual lawyers who earn a 
living from the fee he/she charges the client may not 
be receptive of mediation because there would be 
a lesser role for them if it was implemented. Hence, 
this adversarial ‘hired-gun’ mindset should be steered 
away from. This paper aims to propose a change in 
the law school curriculum which would shift away 
from the adversarial nature of teaching and training 
of lawyers and to place an emphasis on dispute 
settlement as opposed to litigation. Would-be lawyers 
ought to be taught the basic concept of alternative 
dispute resolution at the earliest stage of their 
legal education. At the same time, mediation skills 
should be integrated into substantive law subjects 
and to be refl ected in the curriculum via teaching 
and examinations. By having such a programme, 
it is submitted that the would- be lawyers should be 
inclined towards solving client’s problem through 
alternative modes instead of litigating disputes.
Settlement of disputes in adversarial system
Disputes or confl icts are common in different places 
and circumstances and may arise among workers, 
customers and suppliers, between organisational 
units, departments and even across international 
borders. Disputes between husband and wife, parent 
and child, neighbours and commercial disputes 
ought to be resolved amicably. Achieving this would 
ensure that the relationship would continue to work, 
this would benefi t the parties involved and it would 
maintain social harmony and cohesion. Unresolved 
disputes or confl icts on the other hand may have 
an adverse impact on the relationship between the 
disputants as well as other effects such as their 
productivity and commitment towards their work or 
organisation. The dispute settlement mechanism 
would include negotiation, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, and judicial settlement.
Judicial settlement in the common law system is of 
an adversarial nature. This would involve the fi ling of 
the dispute with the court for relief and with that the 
parties would be subjected to the stringent procedural 
rules of the court. In a civil dispute, parties are required 
to fi le pleadings and other originating documents in 
court thereafter serving these documents to the other 
party either by personal or non-personal service. 
When service of the document in the ordinary form 
appears to be impracticable for any reason, such 
as for example, the defendant’s whereabouts are 
unknown or they could not be traced or the defendant 
refused to accept the delivery or evading service, 
among others, then substituted service may be 
obtained. Part of the litigation proceedings will include 
‘discovery’ and ‘interrogation’, the former involves the 
request for the production of important documents 
while the latter involves the request of pertinent 
information by written questions. Thereafter, case 
management meetings will be fi xed by the court to 
give directions to the parties as to the future conduct 
of their actions in order to ensure just, expeditious 
and economical disposal of the dispute.
The hearing of the dispute will be held in open 
court with the public and the press having access 
to the proceedings. However, in certain exceptional 
circumstances, proceedings may be held in camera. 
The court may make such reservation, for example, 
where they are satisfi ed that it is expedient in the 
interests of justice, public safety, public security or 
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propriety as well as other sufficient reason to do so, 
including where it is necessary to protect the identities 
of victims or interested witnesses.1 The parties would 
have control over the course of the trial through their 
advocate. They may decide on the evidence that 
would be adduced to support their case or claim as 
long as the evidence is relevant and admissible. The 
admissibility of evidence along with the mode of its 
production is regulated by The Evidence Act 1950. 
Section 137 of the same act governs the manner 
in which witnesses are produced and examined in 
court. The parties are given the freedom to present 
their case and set forth their points of view though 
subjected to the existing laws relating to procedure 
and trial. Ultimately, the decision of the case will rely 
on the presentation of the evidence.
Upon hearing all parties concerned along with the 
evidence presented, the court will then make a 
decision. In deciding on the matter, the court would 
have to consider and weigh all questions that were 
raised and the decision would have to be based on 
the evidence collected and heard. The judge must 
thoroughly elucidate the facts and issues of the case 
in hand and thereafter make a decision that attains a 
reasonable degree of certainty. Generally, the judge 
is expected to deliver written grounds of judgment 
which ‘should contain a narration of facts of the case, 
the issues to be adjudicated upon, a discussion on 
evidence, such as contradictions, inconsistencies, 
corroboration, warnings, accomplice’s evidence, etc, 
the findings of facts, a statement of law to be applied 
to the facts so found and finally the conclusion’.2
The decision of the court however, may not 
necessarily be the final say. The party who are 
dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court may, 
subject to the fulfilment of the requirements of the 
relevant law, file an appeal against it in the superior 
courts. Decision from the Magistrates’ court and 
Sessions court would proceed to the High Court. 
Appeals must adhere to the court’s hierarchy. For 
example, an appeal to the Court of Appeal would 
be against the decision of the High Court exercising 
its original jurisdiction, appellate or revisionary 
jurisdiction for the matter that was decided by the 
Sessions Court.3 If the appeal was against the 
1 See the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s  15 
and the Child Act 2001 (Act  611) s  12. See 
also the cases of PP lwn KK [2007] 6 CLJ 367; 
Pendakwa raya  lwn  Shaha ree i l  Sa i d 
[2007] 6 MLJ 567, [2007] 4 CLJ 405.
2 Tun Mohd Salleh Abas, ‘Judgments/Grounds 
of Judgments of Subordinate Courts’ [1984] 2 
CLJ 142.
3 Section 50 Courts of Judicature Act 1964.
decision of the Magistrates’ court, an appeal to the 
Court of Appeal may lie from the decision of the High 
Court exercising appellate or revisionary jurisdiction 
although it would be restricted on question of law 
which had arose during the course of appeal or 
revision.4 The Federal Court, the apex court, will hear 
appeals from the Court of Appeal which had been 
heard and decided by the High Court exercising 
original jurisdiction.5 All appeals to the Federal Court 
must be with the leave of the Federal Court.6 The 
procedure governing appeals to the superior courts 
as well as the machinery for obtaining satisfaction or 
compelling compliance of a judgment is contained 
in the Rules of Court 2012.
From the above, it is apparent that the administration 
of justice in the civil courts adheres to common law 
precedents and statutes. Many of the problems 
associated with the process of litigation are common 
to the adversarial process adopted by the legal 
systems of colonies which had inherited the common 
law and the English legal procedure. It is common 
knowledge that litigation of disputes in the courts 
are costly, time-consuming with unpredictable 
outcomes and above all, creating irreversible 
damage to the relationships between the parties, 
particularly in matrimonial or labour disputes. There 
are many disputes that may be resolved outside 
the framework of conventional litigation, with the 
courts’ role as a last resort after alternative modes 
had been exhausted yet the parties failed to reach 
an amicable solution.
Mediation: An effective mode of dispute 
settlement
Today, mediation is a widely adopted mode of dispute 
resolution as it only takes a fraction of the time of a 
trial or hearing, and it is a cost-effective method of 
resolving dispute. Mediation will cost the parties a 
smaller fraction compared to what they would have 
incurred if the case had been brought to court. Aside 
from the above, mediation is held in a private setting, 
in other words ‘behind closed doors’. What this 
means is that members of the public and journalists 
will not be allowed to attend the mediation process 
except with the consent of the disputing parties. 
Thus preserving the secrecy and confidentiality of 
information that had transpired at the mediation.
Basically, mediation promotes compromise or 
collaboration where the mediator would assist 
the parties in reaching an amicable settlement. 
4 ibid, section 50(2A).
5 ibid, section 87(1).
6 ibid, section 96 (a).




The mediator would listen to the arguments 
forwarded by the parties. He may ask questions 
to guide the disputants and help them understand 
the issues. Furthermore, he would encourage 
the parties to develop a mutually acceptable 
solution. The mediator would also maintain a 
safe and respectful atmosphere. He may offer 
suggestions, recommendations and alternatives 
for consideration by the parties as a means of 
resolving the dispute. The process works because 
the parties are given the power and obligation to 
seek solutions that meet their own needs and 
interests. The disputing parties are able to speak 
for themselves, and work together to fi nd a lasting 
solution to their confl ict under the guidance of the 
mediator. Undoubtedly, mediation can assist the 
disputing parties to re-establish trust and respect, 
prevent damage to an on-going relationship 
unlike conventional litigation. If termination of a 
relationship is the option, mediation can make the 
termination more amicable.
It may be added that for mediation to be effective, 
the mediator must possess unquestionable 
reputation and integrity. At the same time, he must 
have good knowledge of the subject matter of 
the dispute between the parties and the personal 
values of the parties. A mediator should have the 
ability to analyse the issues effectively before he can 
guide the parties towards a settlement. They must 
have patience and tact in creating and maintaining 
rapport with the disputants, enhancing the success 
of the process. By displaying impatience, the 
mediator may jeopardize the mediation, causing the 
disputant to think that if he remains unresponsive 
for a little longer, the process will end. This could 
cause the disputant to lose respect for the mediator, 
thereby reducing the mediator’s effectiveness. 
It is also important to convince the parties that 
mediation would be a better mode of settlement 
and the parties must be made aware of the tedious 
process of the court. The parties must be strongly 
urged to settle their differences through mediation 
where the out-of-court settlement would arrive at a 
win-win solution and their harmonious relationship 
would continue as opposed to a judgment of the 
court where the adversarial nature of ‘winner takes 
all’ would undoubtably poison the relationship 
between the parties and this would lead to the 
deterioration of the relationship.
Mediation however is not, and should never 
assume to be, a substitute for the judicial system. 
It is only an alternative mode of dispute resolution 
and, where mediation failed to amicably resolve 
the dispute, it will be referred to and adjudicated 
in court. The Law Reform (Marriage Divorce) Act 
1976,7 Industrial Relations Act 1967,8 Housing 
Development (Tribunal for Homebuyer Claims) 
Regulations 2002,9 Legal Aid Act 197110 and 
Syariah Court Civil Procedure (Federal Territories) 
Act 1998,11 among others contains provision on 
mediation as a mode of dispute settlement.
Mediation in the courts
Undoubtedly, the courts in many countries are 
burdened with the ever-increasing volume of cases. 
The disposal of cases in the courts would normally take 
many years and this inevitable would have a negative 
impact on the very essence of justice as the famous 
legal maxim encapsulates, ‘justice delayed is justice 
denied’. In order to relieve the courts’ burden, various 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms have been 
introduced. Mediation undoubtedly could ease part 
of the judiciary’s workload, streamline the judicial 
process and ultimately preserve the quality of the 
judicial system. In order to promote mediation in the 
civil courts without going through the trial and appeals 
process, the Chief Justice of Malaysia introduced the 
Practice Direction No. 4 of 2016. It provides that judges 
may, with the consent of the parties, use mediation 
to resolve the dispute and this can be carried out at 
any stage, whether it is before a trial, at the pre-trial 
case management, after the trial has commenced or 
even when the case had reached the appeal stage. 
The parties are allowed to choose either a judge-led 
mediation or a mediator agreeable to both the parties. 
The mediation opted by the parties must be completed 
within a period of 3 months from the date the case is 
7 Act 164. See ss 55(1) and 106 where reconciliation 
is a prerequisite for the fi ling of a divorce petition 
under this Act. See also Divorce and Matrimonial 
Proceedings Rules 1980. Generally, ‘conciliation’ 
and ‘mediation’ are used interchangeably 
although some have argued the existence of some 
difference in the functioning of the two especially 
in relation to their role as a neutral third party.
8 Act 177. See s 20. 
9 PU  (A)  476/2002. For example, reg  23(1), 
which deals with  negotiation for settlement, 
provides: ‘At the hearing, the Tribunal shall, 
where appropriate, assist the parties to effect 
the settlement of claim by consent.
10 Act 26. See Part VA (ss 29A to 29F) of the said 
Act. See also Legal Aid (Mediation) Regulations 
2006 (PU (A) 163/2006). 
11 Act 585. Section 99 of the said Act provides: 
‘The parties to any proceedings may, at any 
stage of the proceedings, hold sulh to settle their 
dispute in accordance with such rules as may 
be prescribed or, in the absence of such rules, 
in accordance with Hukum Syarak.’ See also 
the Syariah Court Civil Procedure (Sulh) (Federal 
Territories) Rules 2004, (PU (A) 18/ 2004).






referred to for mediation. The period may however be 
extended with the approval of the Court. The objective 
of the practice direction is to encourage parties to 
arrive at an amicable settlement without going through 
or completing a trial or appeal. Mediation is also 
employed to solve matters at the appellate stage in 
the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court.12
It may be added that the Practice Direction No. 2 of 
2013 entitled ‘Mediation Process for Road Accident 
Cases in Magistrate’s Courts and Sessions Courts’ 
requires all personal injury claims arising from motor 
vehicle accident to undergo a compulsory mediation 
before a Court Mediation Offi cer (who is either a 
Session Court Judge or a Magistrate, other than the 
presiding Sessions Court Judge or Magistrate who 
is handling the matter).13 The mediation is required to 
take place once the pleadings are closed and not later 
than 10 weeks after the claim has been fi led, along with 
the basic documents such as initial medical report, 
sketch plan prepared by the police investigating offi cer, 
police reports lodged by parties, photos (if available) 
as well as other supporting documents. The 2013 
Practice Direction is not affected and unperturbed by 
the issuance of the Practice Direction No. 4 of 2016.
It is noteworthy that Order 34 rule 2 (2) of the Rules of 
Court 201214 specifi cally states that “the Court may, 
at a pre-trial case management consider any matter 
including the possibility of settlement of all or any of 
the issues in the action or proceedings and require 
the parties to furnish the Court with such information 
as it thinks fit, and the appropriate orders and 
directions that should be made to secure the just, 
expeditious and economical disposal of the action 
or proceedings, including a mediation in accordance 
with any practice direction for the time being issued.” 
Again, Order 59 rule 8(c) of the Rules of Courts 2012 
states that in the exercise of discretion as to costs, 
the court “shall, to such extent, if any, as may be 
appropriate in the circumstances, take into account 
– the conduct of the parties in relation to any attempt 
at resolving the cause or matter by mediation or any 
other means of dispute resolution.”
12 Azmi, Tun Zaki, “Opening Address – 2nd Asian 
Mediation Association Conference” (speech, 
Kuala Lumpur, 24 February 2011).
13 Accident claims are tried in either Magistrate 
Court or Sessions Court, where the former for 
claim less than or at RM100,000, while Sessions 
Court has unlimited jurisdiction to try all actions 
and suits of a civil nature in respect of motor 
vehicle accidents. See section 65 and section 
90 of Subordinate Courts Act 1948.
14 (P.U. (A) 205/2012)
Alongside with the practice directions, the Kuala 
Lumpur Court Mediation Centre was established 
which was to provide free-of-charge mediation 
services conducted by judges or judicial offi cers. An 
eight-page document issued by the Centre contains 
the guideline on mediation services offered by the 
Centre. The Centre has since changed its name to 
the Court-Annexed Mediation Centre Kuala Lumpur 
which is situated inside the Kuala Lumpur Court 
Complex.15 A brochure entitled ‘The Court-Annexed 
Mediation Centre Kuala Lumpur – a positive solution’ 
replaced the previous eight-page document.16 In 
June 2016, the Federal Court Mediation Division 
was established under the supervision of the Chief 
Registrar of the Federal Court of Malaysia. The 
existence of mediation alongside with conventional 
adversarial adjudication provides opportunity for 
the disputants to reach an amicable settlement 
even when a claim is fi led at court. However, the 
adversarial nature of the court would more likely than 
not leave the parties bitter at its judgment.
Singapore Mediation Convention
On 20 December 2018, the United Nations 
General Assembly had adopted the Convention on 
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from 
Mediation which is also known as the Singapore 
Mediation Convention. The Convention is primarily 
aimed at promoting mediation as an alternative and 
effective method of resolving commercial disputes 
with the exclusion of consumer transactions for 
personal, family or household purposes, inheritance 
and employment law. The official signing of the 
Convention was held in Singapore on 7 August 2019 
with 46 states signing it and the Convention will enter 
into force after a lapse of 6 months from the offi cial 
signing date. This Convention is similar to the New 
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards which is also known as 
the New York Arbitration Convention adopted on 
10 June 1958 which provides the framework for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
and the referral by a court to arbitration.
The Singapore Mediation Convention would 
impose an obligation to the parties with respect 
to both enforcement of a settlement agreement 
and the right of a disputing party to invoke a 
15 Court-annexed mediation refers to situation 
where a judge and judicial officers act as 
mediator to litigating parties after they have fi led 
their action in the court.
16 ‘Kuala Lumpur Court Mediation Centre 
Court – Annexed Mediation’ see https://
www.aseanlawassociation.org/11GAdocs/
workshop5-malaysia.pdf




settlement agreement covered by the convention. 
Pursuant to the convention, the settlement 
agreement has cross-border enforcement where 
the agreement arrived thereto can be enforced in 
another convention State, where foreign parties are 
involved. All that is required is that the disputing 
party shall supply to the competent authority the 
settlement agreement signed by the parties and 
evidence that the settlement agreement results from 
mediation. Additional document may be requested 
by the competent authority to satisfy itself that the 
requirements of the convention have been complied.
The competent authority may refused enforcement 
of the settlement agreement under l imited 
circumstances such as where there was lack of 
capacity of either party to the settlement agreement, 
the settlement agreement had been rendered 
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed, or there had been a serious breach of 
conduct on the part of the mediator, or the granting 
of relief was contrary to the public policy of that State 
or if the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of 
settlement by mediation under the law of that State.
Mediation skills among would-be lawyers 
An early involvement in the dispute settlement can 
lead to strengthening relationships and this builds 
teamwork, other than that, it encourages open 
communication and cooperative problem-solving, 
resolves disagreements quickly and concentrates 
on win-win resolutions. Mediation promotes 
compromise or collaboration as people learn how 
to work harmoniously, develop creative solutions 
to problems and reach outcomes that mutually 
benefi t those involved. As seen above, the judiciary 
is proactive in promoting mediation as a mode of 
dispute settlement of civil matters, making court 
appearances as a last resort. The obvious reason 
being that the traditional court process is costly, 
lengthy, and antagonistic; all of which would lead 
to a disillusionment with the state’s legal process. 
Mediation is also extensively promoted at the 
international level and this is evident with the recent 
signing of the Singapore Mediation Convention. 
Hence, the members of the legal fraternity would 
have to take the lead by encouraging their clients to 
seek mediation as an early resolution of their disputes 
including utilising the court-annexed mediation which 
is provided without any additional fee on the parties.
There are many disputes which should ideally 
be resolved through collaborative and less 
confrontational such as the workplaces and 
matrimonial disputes. Apart from providing fast, 
creative and mutually satisfactory resolutions, 
mediation has the potential of preserving the 
relationship between the parties. Mediation can 
mend and preserve frayed working relationships, 
even when the parties are extremely angry. 
Moreover, mediation fosters mutual respect through 
improved communication. The importance of 
mediation is also stressed in the matrimonial cases 
whereby the trust and preservation of family and 
keeping it together would be important. If the parties 
insist on their legal rights to be enforced by court 
or if the chances of getting an amicable and just 
solution by way of mediation are slim, the parties 
could then be referred to the court. Mediation has 
also been found to be a very useful mean for dispute 
settlement in the Legal Aid Department. Majority of 
the cases handled by the Legal Aid Department are 
matrimonial cases and mediation has been found 
to be a very useful mechanism for settlement of 
those cases. 
The success of mediation depends on several 
factors and this includes the support shown by 
the legal advisers alongside the commitment of 
the disputants. To this end, legal advisers must 
play an important role by encouraging their client 
to consider mediation at the preliminary stages of 
a dispute. In fact, a good lawyer must not only be 
able to assist clients in articulating their problems 
but they must also be able to generate, assess, and 
implement alternative mode of solving disputes. 
They have to place the clients’ interests above their 
own, discard the litigation mindset and promote 
mediation, although it may lead to less revenue. 
Individual lawyers earning a living from the fee he/
she charges the client, may not be receptive to 
mediation because there would be a lesser role for 
them if mediation is implemented. However, the 
misconception of the reduction of the role of lawyers 
because of mediation is not entirely correct. Through 
this process, more disputes can be resolved in 
lesser time leading to an increase in productivity.
The adversarial ‘hired-gun’ mindset i.e., the 
‘litigation’ approach, must be discarded and more 
amiable problem-solving skills must be imbued into 
the would-be lawyers. To ensure the successful 
adoption of alternative dispute resolution, the law 
school curriculum must give preference to confl ict 
resolution skills rather than to advocacy or litigation 
skills. In mediation for example, the mediator has to 
guide the parties through the negotiation process; 
advising, listening, and helping them towards a 
win-win solution or at least one that all parties are 
satisfi ed with. A mediator must have the requisite 
skills and knowledge in terms of understanding the 
parties’ desires, collecting information, facilitating 
communication, facilitating agreement and the 






ability to manage cases and documents. The 
mediator’s ability to be creative, to be able to 
deal with strong emotions, sensitivity, reasoning, 
emotional stability, analytical skills, interviewing 
techniques, and a sense of commitment to the 
whole exercise of mediation is equally important. 
The would-be lawyers must be imbued with these 
skills at the earliest stage of their legal education. 
This could be done by integrating those skills into 
the substantive law subjects and has to be refl ected 
in the curriculum, teaching and examination. By 
having these skills into mainstream law subjects, 
future lawyers would be more likely drawn into 
dispute resolution rather than the state court system. 
It is interesting to note that the alternative dispute 
resolution has now been made a compulsory subject 
at the local law schools. By familiarising this subject to 
the students it would create an increase in awareness 
of the alternative dispute resolution mechanism and 
to facilitate the development of alternative dispute 
resolution skills within the law school community.
It is worth noting that the Mediation Act 201217 
provides that a person who possesses the relevant 
qualifi cations, knowledge or experience in mediation 
through training or formal tertiary education or 
satisfi es the requirements of an organisation which 
provides mediation services, can be appointed 
as a mediator under the Act.18 Certification or 
accreditation involves nothing more than an 
individual taking one or more training programmes 
with a reputable or known training body which 
subsequently certifi es the individual as accredited 
mediator. The certifying bodies in Malaysia includes 
the Malaysian Mediation Centre (MMC),19 the Asian 
17 Act 749. 
18 The Mediation Act 2012 provides inter alia, that 
the mediation agreement must be in writing 
(s 6(2)), the appointment of mediators shall be by 
way of agreement (s 7(4)), the parties can obtain 
assistance from an institution for the appointment 
of mediators (s 7(3)), parties can terminate the 
appointment if the mediator no longer satisfi es 
the requirement of the institution, has pecuniary 
interest in the dispute or is found to have obtained 
appointment by fraud (s 8), confi dentiality and 
privileged communication during mediation (ss 
15-16), costs of mediation to be borne equally 
by the parties (s 17) and if the mediation is 
successful, the settlement agreement entered 
into shall bind the parties (ss 13-14).
19 The  Malaysian Mediation Centre  is  a body 
established in 1999 under the auspices of 
the Bar Council of Malaysia with the objective of 
promoting mediation as a means of alternative 
means of dispute resolution. 
International Arbitration Centre (AIAC) and the 
Constructions Industry Developments Board (CIDB), 
among others. The universities with a pool of experts 
among their staff should also be encouraged and 
given the task of conducting mediation training and 
certifying mediators through collaborative efforts with 
the above bodies. 
It may be added that mediation would be more 
effective if disputants are made aware of the 
better value that mediation can offer, such as its 
ability to save costs and its potential for repairing 
relationships. The parties must be told that litigating 
disputes in the courts is costly, time-consuming 
and unpredictable in its outcome. And above all 
this, the ‘winner takes all’ hostile nature of the court 
would inevitably damage the relationships between 
the disputants. Apart from that, the delay in the 
disposal of cases due to the backlog and the costs 
for litigating disputes in court would be substantial, 
not to mention the tremendous costs the parties 
may incur paying to legal representatives. Hence, 
necessary steps should be taken at the grassroots 
to increase public awareness and knowledge of 
mediation. This may be done through writing in 
the mass media or through specifi c programmes 
organised by the law schools in collaboration with 
the legal profession bodies. 
Conclusion
Mediation is an effective and affordable mode 
of dispute resolution. Through this mode, the 
disputants would be self-empowered to find 
better ways to deal with their dissatisfaction and 
needs under the guidance of the mediator. In this 
manner, apart from being economic and saving 
the judicial precious time, the process would 
be able to maintain a harmonious relationship 
between the parties which is vital for the progress 
and development of the nation without any 
impediments. The adversarial ‘hired-gun’ mindset 
must be discarded, and the law school curriculum 
must play an important role by emphasising the 
importance of confl ict resolution skills as opposed 
to advocacy or litigation skills. By adding these 
skills into mainstream law subjects, it is hoped 
that in turn, this would foster future lawyers who 
would place their clients’ interest above their own 
and would be more inclined towards solving the 
client’s problem at the preliminary stages vide the 
alternative modes. The judicial settlement would 
be resorted only after all the peaceful resolution 
avenues have been exhausted and they have failed 
to achieve the desired results. 
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
[1] Civil Procedure — Summary judgment 
— Application for — Whether application 
for summary judgment should be allowed 
— Whether amount of claim correct — 
Whether plaintiff entitled to claim interest 
for late payment — Whether defendant 
agreed to fi x exchange rate — Whether 
defendant’s counterclaim should be 
allowed — Rules of Court 2012 O 14
This was an application by the plaintiff for summary 
judgment on its claim against the fi rst and second 
defendants. The claim against the fi rst defendant, 
the buyer, was for the price of goods sold and 
delivered, and the claim against the second 
defendant was based on a guarantee dated 
22 December 2014. The plaintiff sold and delivered 
fl oor tiles (‘the goods’) to the fi rst defendant from 
time to time pursuant to orders made by the latter. 
Invoices and monthly statements of account were 
issued to the fi rst defendant in respect of the 
goods delivered. The invoices required payment 
within 60 days from the date on the invoice. 
The first defendant confirmed as correct the 
monthly statements of account for the months 
of January-August 2017. By letter dated 19 April 
2017, the plaintiff sought payment of the sum of 
RM1,227,431.86 as acknowledged by the fi rst 
defendant as correct as at 31 March 2017. By the 
same letter the plaintiff notifi ed the fi rst defendant 
that in view of its delay in making payments, it had 
no alternative but to impose late payment interest at 
the rate of 1.5% per month with effect from 1 May 
2017. The plaintiff received no payments from the 
fi rst defendant after September 2017. On 12 March 
2018, the plaintiff instituted this action claiming 
a sum of RM1,085,219.23 and late payment 
interest at the rate of 1.5% per month from the 
fi rst defendant and USD184,000 and late payment 
interest at the rate of 1.5% per month from the 
second defendant based on the letter of guarantee 
dated 22 December 2014. The defendants fi led a 
defence denying liability to pay the sum claimed. 
The fi rst defendant also fi led a counterclaim alleging 
that the plaintiff had breached an implied agreement 
between them to share profi ts from the sale of 
the goods and sought a sum of RM3m as special 
damages. The plaintiff fi led the present application 
for summary judgment on 1  June 2018. The 
defendants resisted the application on four main 
grounds contending that there were triable issues 
as to: (a) whether the amount claimed was correct; 
(b) whether the plaintiff was entitled to claim late 
payment interest; (c) whether the plaintiff and the 
second defendant had agreed to fi x the exchange 
ra te at USD1 to RM3.35 when they signed the 
guarantee; and (d) whether the fi rst defendant had 
a plausible and bona fi de counterclaim.
Held, allowing the plaintiff’s application with costs 
of RM5,000:
(1) On the issue of the alleged payment to the 
plaintiff of RM10,000 on 31  October 2017, 
the court agreed that in the absence of any 
credible evidence to support the payment 
allegedly made, it could not be argued that 
this constituted a triable issue. 
(2) The court agreed with the defendants that 
the plaintiff’s claim for late payment interest 
was a triable issue as it was trite law that a 
seller could not impose late payment interest 
unless it was made known to and agreed by 
the buyer. The fact that the fi rst defendant 
acknowledged as correct the sum claimed in 
the monthly statements of accounts as correct 
did not preclude it from disputing the plaintiff’s 
claim for late payment interest. 
(3) The court agreed with the plaintiff’s contention 
that the allegation that the parties had agreed 
on the exchange rate was without basis 
and if indeed there was so, it would have 
been mentioned in the guarantee. Further, 
there would have been no need to peg the 
guarantee in USD. The court found that this 
was a completely hopeless argument by the 
defendants. 
(4) The contents of the defendant’s letter 
supported the inference that the counterclaim 
raised in these proceedings was nothing more 
than an afterthought by the defendants to 
concoct a defence to defeat the summary 
judgment application. It is elementary law that 
if a defendant puts forward a counterclaim 
which is bona fi de and plausible, then that is a 
valid ground for unconditional leave to defend. 
The counterclaim in the present case did not 
meet the criterion of being either bona fi de or 
plausible. From the point of view of O 14, it did 
not have the merit which entitled it to be taken 
into account in order to defeat the plaintiff’s 
clear entitlement to an O 14 judgment on the 
outstanding principal amount.
Nissha Industrial and Trading (M) Sdn Bhd v Coco 
Floor Sdn Bhd & Anor [2019] 9 MLJ 170
[Annotation: Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail 
& Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400; [1992] 1 CLJ 627, SC (refd).
Rules of Court 2012 O 14.]
[2] Civil Procedure — Interest — Judgment 
interest — Plaintiff obtained judgment 
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defendants  — Judgment and order 
silent on interest — Whether interest on 
judgment debts needed to be specifi cally 
ordered and spelt out in judgment — 
Whether interest on judgment debts began 
to run from date of entry of judgment 
or date of assessment of damages — 
Whether rate of interest 8% or 5%pa
This was an appeal by the plaintiff against the 
decision of the learned senior assistant registrar 
of 28 March 2018 in having allowed the second 
defendant’s application to set aside a writ of seizure 
and sale with costs of RM2,000. On 26  August 
2011, the plaintiff obtained judgment on liability 
against both the fi rst and second defendants. 
Damages were fi nally assessed at RM100,000 on 
21 January 2017 and an order was entered bearing 
that date. The judgment of the court of 26 August 
2011 and the order of the court of 21  January 
2017 did not state that interest would be payable 
on the judgment or on the amount of damages 
assessed and, accordingly, no rate of interest was 
mentioned. On 24  November 2017, the plaintiff 
took out a writ of seizure and sale and claimed the 
sum adjudged to be payable ie RM100,000 plus 
interest at the rate of 8% per year from 26 August 
2011-25  August 2017. Therefore, the interest 
claimed was interest on the judgment debt and 
not pre-judgment interest under s 11 of the Civil 
Law Act 1956. The second defendant applied to 
set aside this writ of seizure and sale. The second 
defendant maintained that since no interest was 
ordered in the judgment or the order of the court 
after assessment of damages, and no rate of 
interest provided for, the plaintiff was therefore 
not entitled to any interest on the judgment sum. 
The learned senior assistant registrar allowed the 
application and hence this appeal.
Held, allowing the appeal with costs of RM500 
subject to 4% allocatur:
(1) Under both O 42 r 12 of the Rules of the High 
Court 1980 and the Rules of Court 2012, 
it was expressly stated that ‘every judgment 
debt shall carry interest’. While the rate of 
interest may be the subject of agreement 
between the parties; that every judgment debt 
shall carry interest was nevertheless expressly 
stated. As expressed, interest on a judgment 
debt need not be specifi cally ordered. The 
position was simply that every judgment debt 
shall carry interest without more. Interest was 
statutorily conferred on all judgment debts. 
It was a right conferred and not merely an 
entitlement to be claimed. 
(2) In so far as interest on judgment debts were 
concerned, under O 42 r 12 of the Rules of 
Court 2012, the court had the power to award 
interest at such rate as may had been agreed 
between the parties. The court may also 
award interest at a lower rate than the rate 
determined by the Chief Justice. However, if 
there was neither an agreed rate nor a lower 
rate of interest ordered, the default rate of 
interest on a judgment debt was the rate 
determined by the Chief Justice. The same 
conclusion was arrived at under O 42 r 12 of 
the Rules of the High Court 1980, save that 
the default rate of interest provided was 8%pa. 
(3) The plaintiff was adjudged as having the right 
to damages on 26 August 2011, at the time 
when the Rules of the High Court 1980 were 
applicable. The plaintiff was entitled to interest 
on the damages assessed from the date that 
judgment was entered ie 26 August 2011 and 
not from the date damages were assessed, 
which was on 21 January 2017. The plaintiff 
had secured a substantive right to damages 
on 26 August 2011 and the prevailing default 
rate of interest then was 8%pa. To hold that 
interest on the judgment debt should be 
5%pa, that being the applicable rate at the 
time damages was assessed, would be unfair, 
unjust and inconsistent with the principles 
enunciated. Such would be to allow a prior 
substantive right acquired to be diminished by 
a subsequent rule of procedure albeit by way 
of subsidiary legislation. No other rate being 
specifi ed either under the judgment or the order 
after assessment of damages, the applicable 
interest rate would be the default rate under 
the Rules of the High Court 1980 ie 8%pa.
Vathemurthy a/l Arumugam & Anor v RS Thanenthiran 
a/l Raman Kutty & Anor [2019] 9 MLJ 212
[Annotation :  Ab Lah bin Ali v Yong Wah 
Sing [2003] 6 MLJ 555, HC (refd); Bandar Teknik 
Sdn Bhd & Ors v Desa Samudera Sdn Bhd [2017] 
MLJU 1097, HC (refd); Berjasa Information System 
Sdn Bhd v Tan Gaik Leong (t/a Juruukur Berjasa) 
& Anor [2017] 3 MLJ 394; [2017] 6 CLJ 251, CA 
(folld); Gooi Hock Seng v Chuah Guat Khim [2001] 
1 CLJ 583, SC (refd); Hunt v RM Douglas (Roofi ng) 
Ltd  [1990] 1 AC 398, HL (refd); Liau Kim Lian v 
Bajuria [1971] 1 MLJ 276, FC (refd); Lim Eng Kay 
v Jaafar bin Mohamed Said  [1982] 2 MLJ 156; 
[1982] CLJ Rep 190, FC (refd); Ritz Garden Hotel 
(Cameron Highlands) Sdn Bhd v Balakrishnan a/l 
Kaliannan [2013] 6 MLJ 149, FC (refd); Simcoe v 
Jacuzzi UK Group Plc [2012] 2 All ER 60; [2012] 
EWCA Civ 137, CA (refd).
Civil Law Act 1956 s 11; Rules of Court 2012 O 
37, O 37 r 1(1), O 42 rr 12, 12A; Rules of the High 
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[3] Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Failure to 
plead — Cause of action — Unpleaded 
causes of action — Whether plaintiffs 
entitled to rely on unpleaded causes of 
action — Whether plaintiffs could claim 
for patent infringement and copyright 
infringement — Rules of Court 2012 O 18 
rr 7(1), 12(1), O 34 r 2(2)(k)
 Contract — Agreement — Breach — 
Whether there was breach of contract by 
defendant
 Copyright — Infringement — Ownership 
of copyright — Claim for infringement 
of copyright — Whether plaintiffs had 
copyright — Whether plaintiffs entitled 
to claim for infringement of copyright — 
Copyrights Act 1987 s 38(3) & (9)
 Patents — Infringement — Action for — 
Claim for patent right — Whether plaintiffs 
had patent right — Patents Act 1983 s 
31(2)(a) & (b)
The present suit was initially fi led by Darul Fikir, a 
partnership against Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka 
(‘DBP’). Darul Fikir applied for an interlocutory 
injunction against DBP pending the disposal of 
the present suit. The application of Darul Fikir was 
dismissed on the ground that Darul Fikir should 
have sued the Board of Control of DBP (‘the board’) 
and not the DBP itself. After the dismissal of Darul 
Fikir’s application, the statement of claim in the 
present case was amended where all the partners 
of Darul Fikir became the plaintiff and the board 
substituted DBP as the defendant. The plaintiffs 
were in the business of publishing, printing and 
distributing religious books. Dr Eng Subhi Taha 
(‘Dr Taha’) was the owner of patent and copyright 
in the colour code of an Islamic religious book, 
Mushaf Al-Quran Bertajwid dan Berwarna (‘the 
book’). Dr Taha owned Dar Al Maarifah, a Syrian 
company (‘the Syrian company’). Darul Fikir and 
the Syrian company entered into a memorandum 
of agreement on 1 November 2007 wherein the 
Syrian company granted exclusive rights to Darul 
Fikir to publish, print and distribute the book in 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, India, China 
and Japan. On 2  September 2016, Darul Fikir 
entered into a contract with the board to print, 
supply and distribute the book (‘the contract’). The 
board was alleged to have breached cl 15.3 of the 
contract when the board issued an open tender 
on 18 September 2017 to invite Bumiputera book 
suppliers to bid for a contract to print, bind and 
supply the books for 2018 without obtaining Darul 
Fikir’s written consent. The issues for determination 
were: (a) whether the plaintiffs could rely on the 
unpleaded causes of action; (b) whether the 
plaintiffs or Dr  Taha had any patent right in the 
colour code; (c) whether the plaintiffs could claim 
ownership of copyright in the colour code; and (d) 
whether there was breach of contract by the board.
Held, dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit with costs:
(1) The plaintiff was mandatorily required by O 18 
rr 7(1) and 12(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 
to plead necessary particulars of the cause 
of action relied on by the plaintiff against the 
defendant. The mandatory requirement was in 
the interest of justice — to inform a defendant 
of the cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff 
against the defendant and would enable the 
defendant to make adequate preparation to 
defend the suit. The plaintiffs could only claim 
one cause of action as pleaded namely the 
board’s breach of contract. The plaintiffs were 
barred from relying on patent infringement and 
copyright infringement. 
(2) The plaintiff had not adduced any evidence 
regarding any patent in the colour code which 
was granted by the Registrar of Patents and 
recorded in the Register of Patents under s 
31(2)(a) and (b) of Patents Act 1983 (‘the PA’). 
The copyright and patent in the colour code 
were owned by Darul Fikir due to the fact that 
Darul Fikir was the exclusive distributor of 
the book. If a patent was not granted by the 
registrar and was not registered in the register, 
any patent right could not be conferred on the 
plaintiffs, Dr Taha and any other person. The 
plaintiffs and Dr Taha had no rights in the colour 
code which was enforceable under the PA.
(3) There was no evidence that Dr Taha had signed 
an exclusive licence in favour of the plaintiffs 
concerning the colour code. The plaintiffs could 
not sue the board for copyright infringement 
regarding the colour code. Even if it was 
assumed that Dr Taha had signed an exclusive 
license for the benefi t of the plaintiffs regarding 
the colour code, the plaintiffs shall not be 
entitled to institute a copyright infringement suit 
against the board except for two circumstances 
namely when the plaintiffs joined Dr Taha as 
co-plaintiff or a co-defendant or the court had 
granted leave for the plaintiffs to commence 
the present suit without the joinder of Dr Taha. 
The two circumstances had not been fulfi lled 
by the plaintiffs hence the plaintiffs could not 
claim for infringement of Dr Taha’s copyright in 
the colour code against the board.
(4) It was found that the board had not breached 
the contract. The contract had lapsed after 
the expiry of one-year duration and no 
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plaintiffs and the board. The price had been 
paid in full by the board to the plaintiffs and 
as the contract was fully performed, there was 
no provision in the contract which barred the 
board from issuing the tender. 
Mohamad bin S Ahmad & Ors v Lembaga Pengelola 
Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka [2019] 9 MLJ 315
[Annotation: Berjaya Times Squares Sdn Bhd 
(formerly known as Berjaya Ditan Sdn Bhd) v M 
Concept Sdn Bhd  [2010] 1 MLJ 597, FC (folld); 
Chuah Aik King (sole proprietor of Sykt B Three 
Technology) v Keydonesoft Sdn Bhd [2019] 8 MLJ 
515; [2018] 10 CLJ 354, HC (refd); Darul Fikir v 
Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka  [2018] 10 MLJ 693; 
[2018] 5 AMR 392, HC (refd); Hock Hua Bank Bhd 
v Leong Yew Chin  [1987] 1 MLJ 230, SC (refd); 
Kedah Cement Sdn Bhd v Masjaya Trading Sdn 
Bhd  [2007] 3 MLJ 597, FC (refd); Master Strike 
Sdn Bhd v Sterling Heights Sdn Bhd [2005] 3 MLJ 
585; [2005] 2 CLJ 596, CA (refd); NVJ Menon v 
The Great Eastern Life Assurance Co Ltd [2004] 3 
MLJ 38; [2004] 3 CLJ 96, CA (refd); Paramill Sdn 
Bhd & Anor v Datuk Joseph Pairin Kitingan [2007] 
7 MLJ 289; [2007] 6 CLJ 192, CA (refd); Tindok 
Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v Tinjar Co  [1979] 2 MLJ 
229, FC (refd).
Copyright (Application to Other Countries) 
Regulations 1990 regs 2, 3(a), (e); Copyright Act 
1987 ss 3, 3(a), 6, 7(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d), (1)(e), 
(1)(f), (3)(a), (3)(b), 10(1), (2)(a), (3), 36(1), 38(1), (2), 
(3), (9), 59A, 59A(1); Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka 
Act 1959; Evidence Act 1950 ss 91, 92; Patents 
Act 1983 ss 3(1), 31(2), (2)(a), (2)(b), 36(1), (2), 58; 
Rules of Court 2012 O 18, O 18 rr 7(1), 12(1), O 
20 r 5(1), (2), (5), O 34 r 2(2)(k).]
[4] Civil Procedure — Striking out — Appeal 
against order allowing striking out — 
Sessions court allowed defendants’ 
striking out application — Plaintiff appealed 
against decision of sessions court — 
Whether Industrial Court’s jurisdiction 
and function were separate and distinct 
from sessions court — Whether plaintiff’s 
claims in Industrial Court and sessions 
court based on different causes of action 
— Whether parties in plaintiff’s claim in 
Industrial Court and sessions court were 
different — Whether plaintiff’s claims led 
to unjust enrichment — Rules of Court 
2012 O 18 r 19(1)(b) & (d)
This was the plaintiff’s appeal against the sessions 
court’s decision dated 13 February 2018 allowing 
the defendants’ application to strike out the 
plaintiff’s statement of claim essentially on the 
argument of duplicity of action by the plaintiff as 
notwithstanding his action against the fi rst and the 
second defendants in the Industrial Court under s 
20 of Industrial Relations Act 1967, the plaintiff had 
also instituted the action before the sessions court 
against the same two defendants together with fi ve 
other defendants. The defendants’ application was 
made under O 18 r 19(1)(b) and (d) of the Rules of 
Court 2012. Their averment was that the plaintiff’s 
claim overlapped with his claim in the Industrial 
Court against the fi rst and the second defendants. 
The plaintiff was under the employment of the 
second defendant and the fi rst defendant owned 
100% of the second defendant. The fi rst and the 
second defendants operated as one unit. Arising 
from the plaintiff’s excellent performance, he was 
appointed as the acting head of procurement 
in August 2016 and subsequently promoted as 
the acting head of procurement on 1 November 
2016. The third to seven defendants were the 
employees of the fi rst and second defendants, 
each heading separate departments. The third to 
the seventh defendants unlawfully conspired with 
each other and other persons whose identities were 
uncertain as well as the second defendant to oust 
the plaintiff from his position as the acting head 
and thereafter as the head of procurement and 
damaged or destroyed the plaintiff’s employment 
with the predominant purpose of injuring the 
plaintiff. On 2 December 2016, the plaintiff was 
forced to leave his job immediately in an utmost 
stressful and embarrassing atmosphere watched 
by his team members and other staffs of the 
second defendants. His dignity and reputation 
were destroyed as he lost his employment and 
livelihood at the age of 43. The plaintiff also suffered 
damage to his economic expectations, loss of 
reputation, stress, anxiety and inconvenience as 
well as injury to his feeling. The plaintiff lodged a 
complaint with the Industrial Relations Department 
for wrongful and unfair dismissal pursuant to s 20 of 
the Industrial Relations Act 1967 on 20 December 
2016. The defendants retaliated maliciously and 
destroyed the plaintiff’s opportunity to obtain 
permanent job with Dell Computers. The plaintiff 
fi led the suit in the sessions court in August 2017 
and claimed for conspiracy, including exemplary 
damages and aggravated damages against all the 
defendants jointly and severally. He also claimed for 
damages against the fi rst and second defendants 
for negligence. On 13 February 2018, the sessions 
court allowed the defendants’ application to 
strike out the plaintiff’s statement of claim,hence, 
the present appeal. The plaintiff argued that the 
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with the defendants’ allegations of duplicity of 
proceeding being misconceived. The issues arose 
were: (a) whether the Industrial Court’s jurisdiction 
and function were separate and distinct from the 
sessions court; (b) whether the two claims were 
based on different causes of action; (c) whether 
the parties in the two claims were different; and 
(d) whether the claims led to unjust enrichment.
Held, allowing the plaintiff’s appeal; setting aside 
decision of the sessions court; and reinstating the 
plaintiff’s claim in the sessions court:
(1) From the statement of claim of the present 
case, the plaintiff’s claim in the session court 
was for the damages for conspiracy and 
negligence, both of which were causes of 
action in tort which the Industrial Court had 
no jurisdiction to grant damages to the plaintiff 
for such claim. In allowing the striking out, the 
sessions court failed to appreciate that the 
plaintiff did not claim damages for wrongful 
dismissal in his statement of claim. The plaintiff 
was not seeking for common law remedy 
for his wrongful dismissal in the sessions 
court whereby his claim was for damages 
for conspiracy and negligence which were 
causes of action in tort. Hence, the plaintiff’s 
claim in the sessions court was distinct from 
the Industrial Court case. 
(2) The plaintiff’s cause of action in the Industrial 
Court was for wrongful and unfair dismissal. 
The issues involved were whether the 
purported retrenchment was genuine and 
whether the termination of the plaintiff’s 
employment was with or without just cause. 
The plaintiff’s cause of action in the sessions 
court were tort of conspiracy and negligence. 
The elements needed to be established and 
the issues involved were completely different 
from that of the Industrial Court case. There 
was no duplicity of proceedings just by the 
reason of the two suits sharing the same 
underlying facts. The causes of action were 
different in nature and the remedies sought 
for were entirely different. 
(3) It was trite law that when a wrong had been 
done by several parties either jointly or jointly 
and severally to another party, that party was 
entitled to fi le a claim against all or any one 
or more of the wrong doers. Since the third 
to seventh defendants could not be joined as 
parties in the Industrial Court, it was apt that 
a separate action was brought against them 
in a civil court. 
(4) The issue of overlapping damages would not 
arise as the damages to be awarded in the 
present suit arose from a different cause of 
action in the Industrial Court proceedings. In 
any event, it was trite law that the plaintiff must 
prove his damages. If there were overlapping 
damages as alleged, the court in assessing 
damages could always take into account the 
award granted in another case and made such 
necessary deduction or adjustment to avoid 
double recovery. In the Industrial Court, until 
the present appeal was argued, the plaintiff 
had not fi led a statement of case. There was 
therefore completely no legal or factual basis 
for the defendants to content that there was a 
duplicity of proceedings thus such contention 
was purely conjecture.
Ng Chia Wei v Air Asia Bhd & Ors [2019] 9 MLJ 332
[Annotation: Ahmad Jefri bin Mohd Jahri @ Md 
Johari v Pengarah Kebudayaan & Kesenian Johor & 
Ors [2008] 5 MLJ 773; [2008] 6 CLJ 473, CA (refd); 
Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan 
Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36; [1993] 
4 CLJ 7; [1993] 2 AMR 1969, SC (refd); Bank 
Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad & Anor v Lorrain Esme 
Osman; Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad & Anor 
v Lorrain Esme Osman & Ors  [1987] 2 MLJ 633; 
[1987] CLJ Rep 472 (refd); Barbara Lim Cheng Sim 
v Uptown Alliance (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] 10 MLJ 
1; [2013] 5 CLJ 488, HC (refd); Blue Valley Plantation 
Bhd v Periasamy a/l Kuppannan & Ors  [2011] 5 
MLJ 521; [2011] 5 CLJ 481, FC (refd); Dr A Dutt 
v Assunta Hospital  [1981] 1 MLJ 304, FC (refd); 
Edward Goh Geok Seng v Dunstan Dumpangol 
& Ors  [1989] 2 MLJ 119, HC (refd); Fung Keong 
Rubber Manufacturing (M) Sdn Bhd v Lee Eng 
Kiat & Ors [1981] 1 MLJ 238, FC (refd); HT Maltec 
Consultants v Malaysian Resources Corporation 
Berhad & Ors [2015] 5 AMR 607, HC (refd); KMS 
Builders Sdn Bhd v Hazama Corporation [2002] 8 
CLJ 553, HC (refd); Kempas Edible Oil Sdn Bhd v 
Prabdhial Singh Dardara Singh [2015] 7 CLJ 203, 
CA (refd); Koperasi Pos Nasional v Hafsah bte 
Mohd Tahir [2002] 6 MLJ 691; [2003] 8 CLJ 209, 
HC (refd); Maybank Investment Bank Berhad v 
Hamzah Mahmood & Anor [2011] 1 LNS 643, HC 
(refd); Milan Auto Sdn Bhd v Wong Seh Yen [1995] 
3 MLJ 537; [1995] 4 CLJ 449, FC (refd); Mooney & 
Ors v Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co & Anor [1967] 1 
MLJ 87 (refd); Perbadanan Perwira Harta Malaysia 
& Anor v Mohd Baharin bin Hj Abu  [2010] 5 MLJ 
295; [2010] 6 CLJ 1, CA (refd); Pet Far Eastern 
(M) Sdn Bhd v Tay Young Huat & Ors [1999] 5 MLJ 
558; [1999] 2 CLJ 886, HC (refd);Seruan Gemilang 
Makmur Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul 
Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 MLJ 1; [2016] 3 CLJ 1, FC 
(refd); Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia & 
Anor [2010] 2 MLJ 333; [2010] 2 AMR 301; [2010] 3 
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Leong Hup Holdings Bhd and other appeals [1996]1 
MLJ 661; [1996] 1 AMR 300, CA (refd); Yeoh Eng 
Kong v Choo Kok Yeow & Anor [2016] MLJU 1722; 
[2016] 3 CLJ 794, CA (refd).
Federal Constitution  art 5(1); Industrial Relations 
Act 1967 s 20; Rules of Court 2012 O 18 r 19(1), 
(1)(b), (1)(d).]
[5] Civil Procedure — Discovery — Discovery 
of documents — Application for order 
pursuant to s 7 of the Bankers’ Books 
(Evidence) Act 1949 — Whether application 
for inspection of banker’s books ought to 
be allowed — Whether test of relevancy 
fulfi l led — Whether application an 
abuse of process — Whether court had 
jurisdiction to grant orders prayed for — 
Whether application for discovery fi shing 
expedition — Whether legal burden of 
proof shifted
 Evidence — Documentary evidence 
— Bankers’ books — Discovery and 
admissibility of — Application for order 
pursuant to s 7 of the Bankers’ Books 
(Evidence) Act 1949 — Discovery and 
admissibility of documents obtained 
under s 7 of the Bankers’ Books (Evidence) 
Act 1949 — Whether copies of bankers’ 
books to be admissible subject to ss 4 and 
5 of the Bankers’ Books (Evidence) Act 
1949 and the rules relating to relevancy 
and admissibility — Bankers’ Books 
(Evidence) Act 1949 ss 4, 5 & 7
 Words and phrases — Bankers’ Books 
(Evidence) Act 1949 — Definition of 
‘banker’s books’ under Bankers’ Books 
(Evidence) Act 1949 — Whether document 
sought to be adduced came within 
defi nition of ‘banker’s books’
This was a decision of the learned High Court judge 
in relation to two applications made by the plaintiff. 
The fi rst being encl 307 to inspect and obtain 
copies of certain documents in the possession 
of Malayan Banking Bhd, CIMB Bank Bhd, and 
CIMB Islamic Bank Bhd (‘the banks’). The second 
being encl 395 being an application for the court to 
determine the admissibility of documents disclosed 
pursuant to the orders made. The plaintiff was 
a publicly listed company, the second and third 
defendants were former directors of the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff alleged that the second and third 
defendant had fraudulently caused the plaintiff 
to enter into a transaction to acquire shares in a 
company that purportedly owned oil exploration 
rights in Indonesia from the fi rst defendant. The 
second and third defendant had personal interest 
in the fi rst defendant which they failed to disclose 
to the plaintiff in breach of the fi duciary duties as 
directors. Shortly after this suit was commenced, 
a company known as Kingdom Seekers Ventures 
Sdn Bhd sued the plaintiff. In its statement of 
claim, Kingdom Seekers pleaded that certain 
companies were related. The plaintiff contended 
to be the second defendants’ corporate vehicle. 
The second defendant held a press conference 
where he stated that monies paid by the plaintiff 
in the share acquisition had been paid to some of 
those related and associate companies. Acting on 
the information in the press conference and the 
statement of claim, the plaintiff sought and obtained 
an order pursuant to s 7 of the Bankers’ Books 
(Evidence) Act 1949 (‘the Act’). The information 
obtained from the fi rst s 7 order led the plaintiff 
to make a further application being encl 307. The 
second and third defendant were resisting encl 
307 on the grounds that: (a) it was misconceived 
and an abuse of process, as the court did not have 
jurisdiction to grant the orders prayed for; (b) the 
application was a fi shing expedition; and (c) the 
application sought to reverse the burden of proof 
which was impermissible in law.
Held:
(1) The scope of the Act was limited to ‘banker’s 
book’ which was defi ned in a non-exhaustive 
way, but it was clear that the words ‘other 
book’ must be read ejusdem generis with 
‘ledger’, ‘day book’, ‘cash book’, and 
‘account book’. The court took an expansive 
view of the word ‘books’ within the defi nition 
of ‘banker’s books’ under the Act. The 
expression was wide enough to encompass 
any matter coming within the definition 
of ‘document’ within the meaning of the 
Evidence Act 1950. For a document to come 
within the meaning of banker’s book it: (a) 
must comprise any transaction record that 
was generated by the bank; or (b) must be a 
document which the bank maintained; for the 
purposes of accounting, audit, reconciliation 
or reporting.
(2) The principal test in granting a s 7 order was 
one of relevancy. The plaintiff’s assertions 
must be assumed to be true in assessing 
the relevance of the information sought to 
be obtained by the order of discovery or 
inspection. Applying the test of relevancy to 
the facts of the application in encl 307, the 
court was of the view that the inspection of 
the banker’s books ought to be allowed, as 
it would go towards establishing the plaintiff’s 
case against the second and third defendants. 
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of the accounts and other books held by the 
banks would establish the money trail and 
would determine whether or not the money 
paid by the plaintiff under the share acquisition 
had found its way back into the accounts 
controlled by the second and third defendants. 
For this reason, the court allowed encl 307. 
(3) The plaintiff here was well entitled to seek 
inspection of the banker’s books, and to make 
copies of entries in such books, in order to 
prove its assertion regarding the fl ow of funds 
back to the second and third defendants. 
This construction was supported by the plain 
words of s 7 of the Act, which in no uncertain 
terms provide for the right to inspect banker’s 
books and to take copies of entries in such 
books. If the document that was sought to be 
discovered did not come within the defi nition 
of banker’s books the applicant must apply 
for third party discovery against the bank in 
question, or to subpoena an offi cer of the bank 
at trial. If what was sought was comprised 
within the defi nition of banker’s books, then 
the only way in which the plaintiff was able to 
obtain a copy of that document was by way 
of an application under s 7. For the above 
reasons, the court disagreed that the court 
did not have the jurisdiction to grant the orders 
prayed for in encl 307. 
(4) Having examined the statement of claim, 
the court was of the view that there were 
sufficient pleaded facts to show that the 
plaintiffs did in fact had a case that may be 
aided by an order of discovery, and that, as 
a consequence, the application for discovery 
was not a mere fi shing exercise. In addition, 
the order sought after under s 7 of the Act was 
not sought against the defendants, but rather 
third parties. If it was not the defendants who 
would be subjected to the court order, then it 
could never be said that the legal burden of 
proof had shifted.
(5) In relation to the question of admissibility of 
the documents received pursuant to an order 
under s 7 of the Act, the court could not 
allow the relevant documents to be admitted 
into evidence without first addressing the 
following matters: (a) the court must fi rst make 
a determination whether a document sought 
to be adduced came within the defi nition of 
‘banker’s books’. Evidence may well have to 
be led as to the purpose for which the bank 
had generated, or maintained a record of, the 
document in question; and (b) the plaintiff must 
satisfy the court that: (i) in the case of a copy of 
an entry in a bankers book, the requirements 
of ss 4 and 5 of the Act have been fulfi lled; and 
(ii) in any other case, the requirements relating 
to proof of a document and its relevancy and 
admissibility have been fulfi lled. 
Protasco Bhd v PT Anglo Slavic Utama & Ors [2019] 
9 MLJ 417
[Annotation: Arnott v Hayes  (1887) 36 Ch D 
731, CA (refd); Barker v Wilson  [1980] 1 WLR 
884, QBD (refd); Douglas v Pindling  [1996] AC 
890, PC (refd); Extreme System Sdn Bhd v Ho 
Hup Construction Company Bhd & Ors  [2010] 
MLJU 1608; [2011] 10 CLJ 186; [2010] 11 MLRH 
820, HC (refd); Idiots’ Asylum v Handysides (1906) 
22 TLR 573, CA (refd); Kenwood Electronics 
(Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v People’s Audio Sdn Bhd & 
Ors [2003] 5 MLJ 276; [2003] 2 AMR 70; [2003] 5 
CLJ 436; [2002] 3 MLRH 877, HC (distd); Manilal 
& Sons (Pte) Ltd v Bhupendra KJ Shan (T/A JB 
International)  [1990] 2 MLJ 282; [1989] 3 MLRH 
223, HC (refd); Howglen Ltd, Re  [2001] 1 All ER 
376, Ch D (folld); South Staffordshire Tramways 
Company v Ebbsmith [1895] 2 QB 669, CA (consd); 
WA Pines Pty Ltd v Bannerman (1980) 30 ALR 559, 
FC (distd); Williams v Williams [1988] 1 QB 161, CA 
(refd); Yekambaran s/o Marimuthu v Malayawata 
Steel Bhd  [1993] MLJU 96; [1994] 2 CLJ 581; 
[1993] 4 MLRH 380, HC (refd).
Bankers’ Book (Evidence) Act 1949 ss 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7; Bankers’ Book Evidence Act 1879 [UK] s 6; 
Evidence Act 1950  ss 17, 21, 62, 90A, 90A(2), 
130(3); Rules of Court 2012 O 24 r 7A, O 24 
r 7A(2).] 
[6] Civil Procedure — Judicial review — 
Application for — Decision to issue 
letters of agreement and bond compelling 
appearance before Shariah Court — 
Freedom of religion — Whether Shariah 
Courts in Selangor had jurisdiction 
over offence under s 97(2) of the 
Administration of the Religion of Islam 
(State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 
(‘ARIE’) — Whether Shariah Courts in 
Selangor had jurisdiction over groups of 
people declared to be non-Muslims by 
virtue of a fatwa — Legal position of fatwa 
— Powers of Chief Syarie Prosecutor — 
Powers of Chief Religious Enforcement 
Offi cer — Administration of the Religion 
of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 
2003 ss 61, 62, 74, 78, 79 & 97 — Federal 
Constitution arts 11, 74 & Ninth Schedule
 Islamic Law — Jurisdiction — Shariah 
Court — Whether Shariah Courts in 
Selangor had jurisdiction over offence 
under s 97(2) of the Administration of 
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Enactment 2003 — Whether Shariah 
Courts in Selangor had jurisdiction over 
groups of people declared to be non-
Muslims by virtue of fatwa
This was a judicial review application of the 
applicants against the decision of the second 
respondent who issued letters of agreement 
and bond compelling them to appear before 
the Shariah Court on pain of monetary penalty 
in respect of an offence under s 97(2) of the 
Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of 
Selangor) Enactment 2003 (‘the ARIE’) which 
was instituted by the fi fth respondent. Pursuant 
to s 84 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, two 
constitutional questions were transmitted to the 
Federal Court being: (a) whether the Shariah Courts 
in the state of Selangor did not have jurisdiction 
in respect of the offence in s 97(2) of the ARIE; 
and (b) if the above question was answered in the 
negative, whether the Shariah courts in the State 
of Selangor did not have jurisdiction over members 
of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at religious group 
including the applicants. The Federal Court had, 
without answering the two constitutional questions, 
remitted the reference back to the High Court on 
the basis that the High Court had jurisdiction to 
hear and dispose of the aforementioned issues. 
The parties were in agreement that the two 
constitutional questions would dispose of the 
judicial review. The applicants submitted: (i)  s 
97(2) of the ARIE was an exercise of legislative 
power under Item 9 of the State List was not a 
precept offence but was in pith and substance 
an offence in respect of mosques or any Islamic 
places of worship, therefore it was an offence 
which could only be tried by the magistrate’s 
court and instituted by the Attorney General. The 
respondents submitted: (1)  s  97(2) of the ARIE 
came under the category of offences against the 
‘precepts of Religion of Islam’. The term ‘precepts 
of Religion of Islam’ was not merely confi ned to 
the basic tenets, but had a much wider meaning 
that included the teachings in the Al-Quran, the 
Sunnah of the Prophet of Islam, the consensus of 
the religious scholars and the authoritative rulings 
of legitimate religious authorities, for the purpose 
of ensuring, preserving and/or promoting rights 
beliefs, right attitudes, right actions and right 
conduct amongst the follower of Islam; and (2) the 
Shariah High Court in Selangor had the jurisdiction 
to declare that a person was no longer a Muslim, 
hence the applicants must fi rst apply to the Shariah 
High Court for such a declaration, before any 
challenge to the jurisdiction over the Shariah Court 
over the applicants was brought.
Held, allowing the application, with RM25,000 
as costs:
(1) Pursuant to art 74(2) read together with 
the provisions of Item 1 of the State List, 
the Selangor State Legislative Assembly 
had powers to make laws with respect to 
mosques or any Islamic public places of 
worship, as well as creation and punishment 
of offences by persons professing the religion 
of Islam against the precepts of that religion. 
Further, by virtue of the provisions of Item 9, 
the State Legislative Assembly had the power 
to make laws in respect of any of the matters 
included in the State List or dealt with by 
state law.
(2) In pith and substance, s 97(2) of the ARIE 
was related to the regulation of mosques. 
The offence created by s 97(2) was in 
substance an offence that was against the 
‘precepts of Islam’ for worship or prayers was 
a fundamental tenet of the religion and the 
regulating of places of worship was necessary 
for the purpose of ensuring, preserving and/
or promoting rights beliefs, right attitudes, 
right actions and right conduct amongst the 
followers of Islam.
(3) The doctrinal stand of the state religious 
authorities so far as the Ahmadis were 
concerned was that the Ahmadis were 
non-Muslims. However, in determining 
the constitutional issue, the court was not 
concerned to ‘adjudicate on the truth of 
religious beliefs or on the validity of particular 
rites’ of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at as 
‘disputes about doctrine or liturgy are non-
justiciable if they do not as a consequence 
engage civil rights or interests or reviewable 
questions of public law’.
(4) Both the fatwas issued by the Mufti for Selangor 
pursuant to s 31(1) of the Administration of 
Islamic Law Enactment 1989 on 22 June 1998 
and on 29 August 1999 were binding on all 
Muslims in the State of Selangor and shall be 
recognised and upheld by the Shariah Courts 
in the State of Selangor. The result of which 
an Ahmadi was considered a non-Muslim 
by the state even though an Ahmadi may 
consider himself to be a Muslim or a member 
of an Islamic sect. The effect of the fatwa was 
that the Ahmadis were considered followers 
of a separate and distinct religion removed 
from Islam. The court therefore accepted the 
contention that a distinctive religious sect like 
the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at which has had 
religious rulings with the force of law against its 
members declaring that they were not Muslims, 
was to be treated as a distinct religious group 
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(5) Art icle 11 of the Federal Constitut ion 
guaranteed the right to every person, including 
permanent residents, migrant workers, 
tourists, international students, asylum 
seekers and refugees, to religion. The right to 
freedom of belief was absolute, but the right 
of freedom to manifest belief was qualifi ed. 
(6) Pursuant to s 2 of the Shariah Courts (Criminal 
Jurisdiction) Act and s 74(1) of the ARIE, the 
Shariah Court did not have any jurisdiction over 
non-Muslims. The powers of the Chief Syarie 
Prosecutor was exercisable only in respect 
of any offence that the Shariah Court was 
competent to try, and that would necessarily 
mean only offences committed by a Muslim. 
Further, investigative powers conferred under 
ARIE to the Chief Enforcement Offi cer and 
Religious Enforcement Offi cers were statutorily 
circumscribed and were exercisable only on 
Muslims.
(7) Having declared the Ahmadis as non-Muslims, 
the state Islamic religious authorities could not 
continue to dictate the manner in which the 
Ahmadis carry out their religious practices or 
restrict the places in which they perform their 
prayers or religious rites. 
Maqsood Ahmad & Ors v Ketua Pegawai 
Penguatkuasa Agama & Ors [2019] 9 MLJ 596
[Annotation: Abdul Rahim bin Haji Bahaudin 
v Chief Kadi, Kedah  [1983] 2 MLJ 370 (refd); 
Acharya Jagadishwaranada Avadhuta and 
Another v Commissioner of Police, Calcutta and 
Others [1990] AIR Cal 336, HC (refd); Associated 
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury 
Corporation  [1947] 2 All ER 680; [1948] 1 KB 
223, CA (refd); Booi Kim Lee v Menteri Sumber 
Manusia & Anor  [1999] 3 MLJ 515, HC (refd); 
Council of Civil Service Unions and others v 
Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935; 
[1985] AC 374, HL (refd); Fathul Bari bin Mat Jahya 
& Anor v Majlis Agama Islam Negeri Sembilan & 
Ors [2012] 4 MLJ 281; [2012] 4 CLJ 717, FC (refd); 
Halimatussaadiah v Public Service Commission, 
Malaysia & Anor  [1992] 1 MLJ 513, HC (refd); 
Harianto Effendy bin Zakaria & Ors v Mahkamah 
Perusahaan Malaysia & Anor  [2014] 6 MLJ 305; 
[2014] 8 CLJ 821, FC (refd); Jenny bt Peter @ Nur 
Muzdhalifah Abdullah v Director of Jabatan Agama 
Islam Sarawak & Ors and other appeals [2017] 1 
MLJ 340; [2016] 1 LNS 1132, CA (refd); Kamariah 
bte Ali dan Lain-lain lwn Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan 
dan Satu Lagi [2005] 1 MLJ 197; [2004] 3 CLJ 409, 
FC (refd); Lam Eng Rubber Factory (M) Sdn Bhd v 
Pengarah Alam Sekitar, Negeri Kedah dan Perlis & 
Anor [2005] 2 MLJ 493; [2005] 2 AMR 471; [2005] 2 
CLJ 159, CA (refd); Lina Joy lwn Majlis Agama Islam 
Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain-lain  [2007] 4 MLJ 
585; [2007] 5 CLJ 557, FC (refd); M Sentivelu a/l R 
Marimuthu v Public Services Commission Malaysia 
& Anor  [2005] 5 MLJ 393, CA (refd); Mamat bin 
Daud & Ors v Government of Malaysia  [1988] 
1 MLJ 119, SC (refd); Mamat bin Daud & Ors v 
Government of Malaysia [1986] 2 MLJ 192; [1988] 
1 CLJ Rep 197, SC (refd); Meeran Lebbaik Maullim 
& Anor v J Mohamed Ismail Marican and The Straits 
Printing Works [1926] 2 MC 85 (refd); Michael Lee 
Fook Wah v Minister Of Human Resources Malaysia 
& Anor  [1998] 1 MLJ 305, CA (refd); Minister of 
Labour, Malaysia v Lie Seng Fatt [1990] 2 MLJ 9, 
SC (refd); Narantakath Avullah v Parakkal Mammu 
and Ors AIR 1923 Madras 171 (refd); PP v Mohd 
Noor bin Jaafar [2005] 6 MLJ 745, HC (refd); R (on 
the application of Williamson) v Secretary of State 
for Education and Employment [2005] 2 WLR 590, 
HL (refd); R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court 
of Malaysia & Anor  [1997] 1 MLJ 145, FC (refd); 
R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd (1985) 18 DLR (4th) 321 
(refd); SMC No 1 of 2014 [2015] 2 LRC 583 (refd); 
Shergill and others v Khaira and others [2014] 3 All 
ER 243, SC (refd); Sulaiman bin Takrib v Kerajaan 
Negeri Terengganu (Kerajaan Malaysia, intervener) 
and other applications  [2009] 6 MLJ 354; [2009] 
2 CLJ 54, FC (refd); Susie Teoh; Teoh Eng Huat 
v Kadhi of Pasir Mas Kelantan & Majlis Ugama 
Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu, Kelantan, In Re 
[1986] 2 MLJ 228 (refd); Syed Mubarak bin Syed 
Ahmad v Majlis Peguam Negara  [2000] 4 MLJ 
167; [2000] 3 AMR 3048, CA (refd); United States 
v Ballard (1944) 322 US 78 (refd). 
Administration of Islamic Law Enactment 1989  s 
31(1); Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 
1962 of Kedah ss 38(2), 41, 163(1); Administration 
of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 
2003 ss 2, 4, 49, 61, 61(3), (3)(b)(x), 62(2), 74, 74(2), 
78(2), 79, 97, 97(2); Constitution of Pakistan art 
20; Control of Islamic Religious Schools (Malacca) 
Enactment 2002 s 5(3); Courts of Judicature Act 
1964 s 84; Federal Constitution arts 11, 11(1), (3), 
(4), (5), 74, 74(2), 145(3), Ninth Schedule, Federal 
List, State List, Items 1, 9; Penal Code [IND] s 494; 
Penal Code s 298A; Rules of Court 2012 O 53 r 
2(3); Subordinate Courts Act 1948 ss 76, 82, 85, 
87; Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965 s 
2; Syariah Criminal Offences (Takzir) (Terengganu) 
Enactment 2001 ss 10, 14; Syariah Criminal 
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